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Introduction
Following the progress made by the civil rights movement to secure
educational opportunities for racial and ethnic minority students in
landmark decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, 1 civil rights
advocates and policymakers were able to use prior successful legal strategies and challenges to secure educational rights for students with
disabilities. 2 Several of the earliest legal challenges to school segregation
†

Assistant Professor of Special Education, New York University Steinhardt
School of Culture, Education, and Human Development. I thank Robert
Strassfeld for his comments on my draft, and I thank Taru Taylor for his
timely research assistance.

1.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2.

Id. Many school systems that were already under a court’s desegregation
order were more likely to be found to have discriminatory placement patterns
in their special education programs. For instance, in Lee v. Macon County
Board of Education—a lawsuit filed by civil rights attorney Fred Gray
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involved separate classrooms and instruction for students with a disability or the disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority students with disabilities within the most restrictive special
education settings in public schools. 3 In the decades following the
against one school board—parents (on behalf of their children) sought an
injunction to prevent the Macon County School Board from continuing to
run schools segregated by race. See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 221 F.
Supp. 297, 297–98 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (issuing an injunction against maintaining
a segregated school system and the race-based assignment of teachers and
school employees). Eventually, the case expanded to include the Alabama
State Board of Education and over one hundred local school systems. See
Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 745 (M.D. Ala. 1964)
(expanding the case to the Alabama State Board of Education); Lee v. Lee
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (granting
state sought declaration that its schools had achieved unitary status and
compliance with the court’s earlier orders regarding elimination of the vestiges of de jure segregation as it related to special education in its schools).
In 1997, Judge Myron Thompson, in the Middle District of Alabama, called
on the parties in twelve of these cases to negotiate a settlement of the suits
that would bring the districts to unitary status, a process whereby the district
eliminates the effects of any past segregation to the most practical extent
possible. Lee, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59. Within the course of the discovery,
plaintiff parties found that, in addition to segregation by race, there was also
evidence of overrepresentation of African American students in the “mentally
retarded” disability category and underrepresentation of African American
students in the “learning disabled” and “gifted” disability categories. Lee v.
Butler Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.70-T-3099-N, 2000 WL 33680483, at
*2 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2000).
During 1997 and 1998, all parties initially met and engaged in discovery and
negotiated consent decrees to address, among other things, issues regarding
disproportionate representation. Id. at *1–2. Four major components of the
decree were agreed upon. First, changes to policies and procedures within
the special education placement and related services process (e.g., prereferral, referral, evaluation, and identification stages) and changes to the
eligibility criteria must be addressed by each Local Educational Agency
(LEA). Id. at *2–4. Second, there must be extensive teacher training regarding
etiology and characteristics by specific disability type. Id. at *3. Third,
funding for general education curriculum must address literacy issues and
services for at-risk students. Id. at *5. Finally, there must be extensive state
monitoring of placement and identification practices set forth by each LEA.
Id. at *4. In 2000, the parties resolved to enter into a consent decree to
resolve racial disproportionality in special education placements, and a continuing review of progress continued until 2006. See Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of
Educ., No. 3:70cv845-MHT, 2006 WL 1041994, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 20,
2006) (approving the consent decree). Current federal statutory special education disproportionality provisions closely resemble this decree.
3.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) outlines a range of
special education settings and placements for students with disabilities that
exist on a continuum. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2005) (codified as 20 U.S.C. 1400
et seq.). Under IDEA 2004, eligible students with disabilities in public schools
must be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with children who do
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Brown decision, racial and ethnic minority students gained access to
integrated classrooms. Over time, however, student placement by
factors such as ability-level grouping, disability category, and academic
achievement produced patterns of internal resegregation for racial and
ethnic minority students in desegregated schools. 4 Even though
students with disabilities and students without disabilities share a
vibrant civil rights legacy in regards to securing educational rights and
opportunities, the achievement gap between students with and without
disabilities persists. 5 Moreover, decades of research affirms that racial
and ethnic minority students have often been reported to be both
under- and over-identified for special education and related services. 6
Disproportionality is a complex phenomenon, but it can best be
defined as the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of a racial or
ethnic minority group in special education relative to the presence of
this group within the overall student population.7 According to a 2016
report issued by the National Center for Education Statistics, approximately 13.5% (6.5 million) of all students in K-12 public schools receive
special education and related services. 8 The percentage of students

not have disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 2005). Students
with disabilities can only be educated in a more restrictive setting when the
severity of the student’s disability sufficiently impairs the student’s ability to
be in a general education classroom. Id.
4.

Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, The Civil
Rights Project, Harvard Univ., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? (2003).

5.

Janette Kettmann Klingner et al., Outcomes for Students with and without
Learning Disabilities in Inclusive Classrooms, 13 Learning Disabilities
Res. & Prac. 153 (1998).

6.

Paul L. Morgan et al., Are Black Children Disproportionately Overrepresented
in Special Education? A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 83 Exceptional Child.
181 (2017); 34 C.F.R. § 300–99 (2016); Dalun Zhang et al., Minority Representation in Special Education: 5-Year Trends, 23 J. of Child and Fam.
Stud. 118, 123 (2014).

7.

See Julie M. Bollmer et al., IDEA Data Ctr., Methods for Assessing
Racial/Ethnic Disproportionality in Special Education: A Technical Assistance Guide (Revised) (2014) (providing technical assistance
and interpretation of disproportionality methodology). For purposes of this
discussion, the terms “disproportionality” or “disproportionate representation”
are synonymous. The terms “under-representation” and “over-representation”
are specifically used within this discussion to designate a placement at either
end of the spectrum. The term “significant disproportionality” is used solely in
relation to regulatory provisions within the Individuals with Disability Education Act.

8.

Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., Children and Youth with Disabilities
1 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cgg.pdf [https://perma
.cc/K8SH-SJ2E].
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served under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)9
is highest for American Indian/Alaska Native students (seventeen
percent), followed by African American/Black students (fifteen
percent), White/Caucasian students (thirteen percent), students of two
or more races (twelve percent), Hispanic students (twelve percent),
Pacific Islander students (elevent percent), and Asian students (six
percent). 10
Studies that have examined disproportionate representation in
special education have identified various factors to explain the presence
of disproportionate representation including teachers’ race and ethnicity bias, school-level characteristics such as student population size,
rural/urban school district classification, or student- and parent-level
characteristics such as family-level income, parental education attainment, or disability category of the student. 11 However, studies have had
inconclusive or contradictory findings as to which of these factors predominately account for disproportionality within a district. 12 A
criticism of studies in this area is that some studies are only
correlational in nature or have not adequately addressed causal factors
such as discriminatory practices, procedures, or racial, ethnic, and
gender bias in the referral and evaluation process. 13 Because of the
uncertainty regarding the underlying causal factors for disproportionate
representation within special education, federal law has required that
local educational agencies (LEAs) monitor, report, and identify ways to
address disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority
students in special education. 14
9.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012).

10.

Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., supra note 8, at 2.

11.

See generally John L. Hosp & Daniel J. Reschly, Disproportionate Representation of Minority Students in Special Education: Academic, Demographic, and Economic Predictors, 70 Exceptional Child. 185, 190 (2004)
(examining representation rates of racial and ethnic minority students in
special education using district-level academic, demographic, and economic
predictor variables); Russell J. Skiba et al., Achieving Equity in Special
Education: History, Status, and Current Challenges, 74 Exceptional
Child. 264 (2008) (offering a history of disproportionate representation in
special education and providing recommendations based on racial and ethnic
disparities found within special education practices).

12.

See, e.g., Skiba et al., supra note 11, at 264 (stating that “a number of
factors may contribute to disproportionality”); Amanda L. Sullivan & Aydin
Bal, Disproportionality in Special Education: Effects of Individuals and
School Variables on Disability Risk, 79 Exceptional Child. 475 (2013)
(finding that a student’s gender, race, socioeconomic status, and number of
suspensions are the most reliable predictors of disability identification).

13.

Morgan et al., supra note 6.

14.

20 U.S.C. § 1418(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2005).
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Even with monitoring and enforcement provisions in place, there
are concerns that states fail to adequately monitor and identify the
disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority students
in special education. In 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office issued a report on racial and ethnic overrepresentation in special
education in U.S. public schools. 15 The report examined the characteristics and extent to which LEAs provide coordinated early intervening
services (CEIs) when overrepresentation is found, how states determine
which LEAs are required to provide CEIs, the types of CEIs provided,
and what constituted oversight by the State Department of Education. 16 The report found that, even though overrepresentation is consistently cited as an education practice concern by education researchers, most states actually do not identify problems in their districts
regarding over-identification of minority students in special education.17
The report concluded that some of the examined states did have some
instances of district-level and state-level overrepresentation within the
oversight process. 18 However, a lack of uniformity across states’ disproportionality monitoring and measures made it more difficult to make
state comparisons or interpret findings of disproportionate representation. 19
In 2014, the Department of Education submitted a Request for
Information to address significant disproportionality 20 under section
618(d) of IDEA, which included a specific request to the public to submit comments for recommendations for how to best address significant
disproportionality based on race and ethnicity in the identification of
children for special education, placements, and disciplinary actions.21
After an impassioned public comment period, the final Department of

15.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-137, Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Standards Needed to Improve Identification of Racial and Ethnic Overrepresentation in Special
Education (2013).

16.

Id. at 1–3.

17.

Id. at 7.

18.

Id. at 21.

19.

Id. at 18. The GAO report found that, of the approximately 15,000 school
districts nationwide that received IDEA funding in SY 2010–2011, states
only required 356 (2.4%) to allocate funds towards early intervening services
due to significant disproportionality. Id. at 7.

20.

Request for Information on Addressing Significant Disproportionality Under
Section 618(d) of the Individuals With Disabilities Act (IDEA), 79 Fed. Reg.
35154 (June 19, 2014).

21.

Id.
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Education regulations to guide states and LEAs regarding special education practices were released in December 2016. 22
These new and revised regulations address the effects of disproportionate identification, both over- and under-identification, of racial
or ethnic minority students who receive special education and related
services and are intended to promote equity within IDEA
enforcement. 23 The regulations are further intended to increase state
accountability for the effects, if any, of being placed in more restrictive
environments or in settings that lack academic rigor. 24 Specifically, the
new regulations under IDEA require that states and LEAs take steps
to determine the presence of significant disproportionality, and to
address and to remedy disproportionate placement, if found. 25 The
regulations also establish a standard methodology that states must use
to determine whether significant disproportionality occurred within the
state and in LEAs. In addition, each state must now address significant
disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of disciplinary
action (including suspensions and expulsions). 26 Finally, states must
clarify their existing requirements for the review and revision of relevant
policies, practices, and procedures when significant disproportionality
is found. LEAs must then identify and correct the factors that
contributed to significant disproportionality via comprehensive CEIs. 27
While the revised regulations aim to provide greater uniformity for
states on the reporting of both over- and under-identification of students with disabilities by race and ethnicity, the systemic identification
of students with disabilities into special education and related services
by race and ethnicity must be examined not only as a policy-based
issue, but also as a legal concern for parents, school districts, and states.
That is, even though states are, increasingly, under greater pressure to
identify and address significant disproportionality in the placement of
22.

34 C.F.R. §§ 300–99 (2016).

23.

Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,376 (Dec. 19,
2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).

24.

Id.

25.

The final regulations became effective on January 18, 2017. Id.

26.

The regulations highlight disparity in the discipline of students with disabilities
by race and ethnicity as a focal concern. Specifically, each state must now
examine significant disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of
disciplinary actions—including suspensions and expulsions—with the same
statutory remedies required to address significant disproportionate representation within the identification and placement processes for students with
disabilities. Id.

27.

These services for children must be provided to children from age three
through grade twelve, both with and without disabilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.226
(2016).
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minority children into special education, current reports indicate that
states under-report, fail to report, or face a lack of severe penalties or
sanctions when found to have significant disproportionality within the
state. 28 For racial or ethnic minority parents who have a child with a
disability enrolled in an LEA that has been found to have significant
disproportionality under IDEA, there is a growing interest in pursuing
legal action with the limited number of legal remedies for plaintiff parents and children that are available.
The pursuit of equity regarding proportional placement for minority
students with disabilities must also be placed within the broader provision of civil rights for racial and ethnic minority students. The continuing difficulties faced by parents of racial and ethnic minority students
who reside in districts that have run afoul of IDEA regulations must be
viewed as a continuing civil rights concern where civil rights continue
to be at stake. This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on
the history of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, specifically analyzing how the Act has been reauthorized over time to include
provisions that address the disproportionate representation of minority
students in special education. Part II examines how states currently use
different measures to frame and, ultimately, address the problem of
disproportionate representation and the Department of Education’s role
in preventing over-identification. It also explores how education federalism, the practice of favoring significant autonomy for states and local
school boards, even in instances where constitutional or federal statutory rights are involved, causes inconsistent definitions of disproportionality and under-enforcement of IDEA’s protection against disproportionate placement. Part III examines Blunt v. Lower Merion School
District 29 and the high bar that courts set for plaintiffs who assert that
their school district discriminated against racial and ethnic minority
students with disabilities and allege intentional discrimination claims
against school districts. Finally, this Article concludes by examining the
potential impact of new regulatory changes and offering recommendations for future best practices.

I. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and
Disproportionality
In the landmark Brown v. Board of Education ruling, the Supreme
Court mandated the end of segregation within the U.S. public school

28.

See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 81
Fed. Reg. at 92,376 (summarizing the limitations of state reporting).

29.

826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014).
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system. 30 The Brown ruling also provided the legal foundation for potential plaintiffs who were parents of students with disabilities. In 1972,
plaintiffs brought two cases to challenge the exclusion of students with
disabilities from the public education system: Pennsylvania Ass’n for
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania 31 and Mills v. Board of
Education. 32 The plaintiffs in PARC argued that a state law that specifically allowed public schools to deny services to children “who have
not attained a mental age of five years” 33 at the time they would typically enroll in first grade violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. 34 The district court agreed to
enforce a negotiated consent decree that required the state to provide
each child with a disability a free, appropriate public education that
was individualized and based on that child’s capacity and that acknowledged a due process right to a hearing prior to any change in a student’s
educational status or assignment. 35 As a consequence, the state began
to provide free education to children with disabilities up to age 21. 36 In
articulating the idea of a free, appropriate public education, the PARC
court established the “appropriateness standard” that Congress would
later adopt within federal special education legislation. 37
In addition, the Brown ruling provided the foundation for subsequent legislation requiring access to public education for students with
disabilities. 38 Parents of children with disabilities spent years advocating for the passage of civil rights legislation for students with disabilities, 39 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA) has been hailed as a fruit of those labors. 40 Under the
30.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

31.

343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

32.

348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

33.

PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282.

34.

Id. at 283.

35.

Id. at 302–03.

36.

See, e.g., Gabriela Brizuela, Note, Making an “Idea” a Reality: Providing a
Free and Appropriate Public Education for Children with Disabilities Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 595,
598–603 (2011) (describing PARC and early government responses to the
case to remedy a history of discrimination against children with disabilities).

37.

See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142,
§ 4, 89 Stat. 775, 775–76 (1975) (incorporating “free appropriate public
education” as an educational right).

38.

See, e.g., id. (providing educational assistance to all students with disabilities).

39.

Roberta Weiner & Maggie Hume, And Education for All: Public
Policy and Handicapped Children (1987).

40.

See Note, Enforcing The Right to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1105
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EAHCA, a child with a disability was guaranteed the right to a free,
appropriate public education. 41 In addition, the EAHCA secured procedural rights and safeguards for parents. 42 In 1990, Congress renamed
the Act the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 43 and updated
provisions to ensure that students, ages three to twenty-one with a
disability that serves as an educational impairment, have access to a
“free appropriate public education” 44 that provides individualized special education and related services to prepare them for “further education, employment, and independent living.” 45 Thus, an LEA must
provide special education and related services to any student who meets
the criteria for one (or more) of the thirteen IDEA-eligible disability
categories and who has demonstrated that he or she has a disability
that serves as an education impairment. 46 After a student has been
evaluated and classified as a student with a disability under IDEA, an
Individualized Education Program (IEP), a written and mutually agreed upon document, is drafted and finalized by the IEP team. This team
can include parents, special education and general education teachers,
specialists, or school counselors. The mutually agreed upon IEP is then
reviewed periodically and revised to ensure that the student’s needs and
progress toward measurable goals are met.47
Services for IDEA-eligible students are meant to be individualized
for each student and based on non-discriminatory identification and
evaluation methods, but concerns about discriminatory practices and
disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic minority students

(1979) (explaining how the EAHCA resulted from state recognition that
federal funding and procedural safeguards were necessary in order to provide
free and appropriate public education to students with disabilities).
41.

See EAHCA, Pub. L. 94-142, at § 3. Under the IDEA, a free and appropriate
public education (FAPE) includes special education and related services that
“have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, meet the standards of the State educational agency;
include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and are provided in conformity with the Individualized Education Program required.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)–(D) (2012).

42.

EAHCA, Pub. L. 94-142, at § 5.

43.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).

44.

Id. § 1401(d)(1)(A).

45.

Id. The thirteen disability categories covered under IDEA are: Autism, DeafBlindness, Deafness, Emotional Disturbance, Hearing Impairment, Intellectual
Disability, Multiple Disabilities, Orthopedic Impairment, Other Health Impairments, Specific Learning Disability, Speech or Language Impairment, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Visual Impairment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2016).

46.

34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c) (2016).

47.

34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1)(i–ii) (2016).
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ultimately placed in special education have been persistent and continuing concerns for advocates, educators, and policymakers. In fact, disproportionate representation has been identified as an education dilemma since the 1960s when educational researcher Lloyd Dunn found
that between sixty to eighty percent of students identified as the “educable mentally retarded” 48 were children who came from low-socioeconomic backgrounds or were classified as African American/Black.49
Subsequently, National Research Council reports, policy briefs, position
statements, and federal civil rights investigations have examined and
addressed disproportionate representation as a persistent problematic
practice in special education that requires careful monitoring. 50
Congress amended IDEA in 1997 51 and reauthorized it in 2004.52
The amendment most notably addressed the issue of disproportionate
representation of racial and ethnic minority students in special education. The 1997 amendments required states to start monitoring and
identifying LEAs and, if the state found significant disproportionality 53
within the LEA, the LEA was required to “provide for the review and,
if appropriate, revision of policies, procedures, and practices used in
such identification or placement to ensure that such policies, procedures, and practices comply with the requirement of this [Act].” 54 In
2004, Congress reauthorized IDEA and “prioritized the problem of
racial disproportionality, [in part] because neither the 1997 amendments

48.

Lloyd M. Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded—Is Much of It
Justifiable?, 35 Exceptional Child. 5, 5 (1968).

49.

Id. at 6.

50.

See generally Comm. on Minority Representation in Special Educ.,
Minority Students in Special Education and Gifted Education (M.
Suzanne Donovan & Christopher T. Cross eds., 2002) (studying the issue of
racial and ethnic minority student disproportionate representation in special
education); Council for Children with Behavioral Disorders, CCBD’s Position
Summary on Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special Education, 38
Behav. Disorders 108 (2013); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special
Educ. & Rehab. Servs., 37th Annual Report to Congress on the
Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
2015 (2015) (providing a comprehensive analysis of state compliance with
IDEA and outcomes regarding the education of students with disabilities).

51.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (prior to 2004 reauthorization).

52.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1491).

53.

20 U.S.C. § 1418(d)(1) (2012) (effective Dec. 3, 2004).

54.

Id. § 1418(d)(2)(A).
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nor [the Office of Civil Rights] appeared to have had much impact on
the problem.” 55
Within the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, Congress highlighted racial
and ethnic minority student disproportionate representation as one of
three priority areas for monitoring and enforcement by the states. 56 To
ensure compliance with previous policy that mandated that states address current practices, policies, and procedures when significant racial
and ethnic disproportionality occurred, the reauthorization included
amended language that required states to have policies in effect that
are “designed to prevent the inappropriate over-identification or disproportionate representation by race and ethnicity of children as children
with disabilities.” 57 Within the 2004 provisions, states were also required to monitor districts for “significant discrepancies” in disciplinary
practices, which can include suspensions and expulsions. 58
Prior to the revised 2016 regulations, each state had been required
to develop its own disproportionality monitoring system to collect and
examine data to determine if, within the special education and related
services processes, significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity occurred in the state and the LEA. 59 The older regulatory provisions did not specifically define what significant disproportionality
meant under the IDEA and allowed each state to make its own determination as to what constitutes significant disproportionality. However,
each IDEA-funded state was required to collect and examine data pertaining to: “(1) the identification of children as children with disabilities
including the identification of children with IDEA-disability categories;
(2) the placement of children with disabilities across settings; and (3)
the incidence, duration, and types of disciplinary actions (including suspensions and expulsions).” 60 If a state made a determination of significant disproportionality with respect to the identification or placement
of a child with a disability, then the state was required to provide for
the review and revision of the policies, procedures, and practices to
ensure compliance. In addition, the LEA with significant disproportionality had to reserve the maximum amount of funds under Section
613(f) of the IDEA to provide “comprehensive coordinated early intervening services to serve children in the LEA, particularly, but not ex55.

Susan Fread Albrecht et al., Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special
Education: Is It Moving Us Forward?, 23 J. of Disability Pol’y Stud., no.
1, 2012, at 14, 15.

56.

20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3)(C) (2012) (effective Dec. 3, 2004).

57.

Id. § 1412(a)(24).

58.

Id. § 1412(a)(22)(A).

59.

34 C.F.R. § 300.646(a) (2016).

60.

Id. § 300.646(a)(1)–(3).
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clusively, children in those groups that were significantly overidentified.” 61 Finally, each LEA had to publicly report on revisions made to
its policies, procedures, and practices after a finding of significant
disproportionality under the IDEA. 62
Within the 2004 reauthorization to IDEA, and to add further heft
to the monitoring requirements for states, Congress also heralded policy
priority with the allocation of two (out of twenty) IDEA policy indicators for state IDEA compliance to disproportionality monitoring.63
Each of the twenty indicators are related to monitoring performance
related to implementation of Part B of IDEA for students ages three to
twenty-one, and states must then submit the data annually to the U.S.
Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs
(OSEP). 64 Indicator nine requires states to identify the proportion of
districts exhibiting “disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic

61.

Id. § 300.646(b)(2).

62.

Id. § 300.646(b)(3).

63.

Across the state’s monitoring of the areas covered under the indicators, the
primary focus of the State’s monitoring activities must improve educational
results and functional outcomes for all children with disabilities and ensure
that public agencies meet the program requirements under Part B of the
IDEA, with a particular emphasis on those requirements that are most
closely related to improving educational results for children with disabilities.
Id. § 300.600(a–e). The twenty IDEA indicators include: Graduation Rates;
Drop-Out Rates; Participation and Performance on Statewide Assessments;
Suspensions and Expulsions; Participation/Time in General Education
Settings; Preschool Children in General Education Settings; Preschool
Children with Improved Outcomes; Parental Involvement; Disproportionate
Representation in Special Education that is the Result of Inappropriate
Identification; Disproportionate Representation in Specific Disability Categories; Timeframe Between Evaluation and Identification (Child Find);
Transition between Part C and Part B; Post School Transition Goals in IEP;
Participation in Postsecondary Settings One Year After Graduation; Timely
Correction of Noncompliance; Resolution of Written Complaints; Due
Process Timelines; Hearing Requests Resolved by Resolution Sessions;
Mediations Resulting in Mediation Agreements; and Timeliness and Accuracy
of State Reported Data. See Part B Indicators, Nat’l Dissemination Ctr.
for Children with Disabilities, http://www.drcvi.org/_literature
_183445/Part_B_Indicators [https://perma.cc/K25L-6QE4] (last updated
Apr. 2013) (listing the monitoring indicators identified by the Office of
Special Education Programs (OSEP) and the related requirements found in
IDEA for state administrators responsible for completing state performance
plans (SPPs) and annual performance reports (APRs)).

64.

Each state’s plan for addressing each of the twenty indicators is outlined
within the State Performance Plan, which is then included with each state’s
Annual Performance Report. Batya Elbaum, Challenges in Interpreting
Accountability Results for Schools’ Facilitation of Parent Involvement Under
IDEA, 24 J. Disability Pol’y Stud., no. 4, 2014, at 206.
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groups in special education and related services, to the extent the representation is the result of inappropriate identification.” 65 Indicator ten
requires states to identify the percent of districts in the state with
“disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic groups in specific
disability categories that is the result of inappropriate identification.”66
Finally, each state had to monitor all LEAs within the state using
quantifiable and qualitative indictors to measure disproportionate representation in special education and related services to the “extent the
representation is the result of inappropriate identification.” 67
While IDEA is a progression of civil rights obtained in civil rights
litigation, it has taken multiple amendments to the Act to delineate the
process for determining significant disproportionality. Over time, states
have received increasing levels of monitoring and enforcement powers
over practices at both the state- and district-level.

II. Disproportionality Policy Monitoring and
Enforcement Under IDEA
As the previous Part describes, the IDEA amendments and the 2004
reauthorization reserved considerable discretion to the states pertaining
to the implementation of its requirements regarding disproportionality.
This is consistent with a strong tradition of regarding education as
largely a state and local matter. Because statutes like IDEA, along with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are sources
of federal rights, education creates a terrain for shifting balances between federal and state control. Some commentators have described
this tug of war between the federal government and the states in terms
of education federalism. 68 Professor Kimberly Robinson has defined education federalism as “a balance of power between the federal, state, and

65.

20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3)(C) (2012).

66.

Id.

67.

34 C.F.R. § 300.600(d)(3) (2016); 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (a)(3)(C) (2012).

68.

Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory
L.J. 125 (2006) (examining the education federalism issues arising from the
No Child Left Behind Act); Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and
the New Education Federalism, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 565 (2015); Rachel F.
Moran, Bilingual Education, Immigration, and the Culture of Disinvestment,
2 J. Gender, Race, and Just. 163 (1999) (exploring the impact of federal
retreat from support of bilingual education in deference to the states on
bilingual instruction); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of
Education Federalism, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 287 (2013) (examining the
deleterious impact of education federalism on school desegregation efforts, on
attempts to rectify inequality resulting from current school finance regimes
through litigation, and on reforms intended under the NCLB).
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local governments that emphasizes substantial state autonomy over
education.” 69
The strong preference for state and local control of education is not
surprising. To begin, education has historically been a matter that fell
within the ambit of what states and local governments did. There are
good reasons for a predisposition for local autonomy, ranging from a
belief that local authorities are more likely to understand the idiosyncratic needs of their residents, to a belief that local control is likely
to be more democratic control. History regarding such matters as school
desegregation has demonstrated, however, that complete abdication to
local control can undermine important federal rights. Desegregation
has, indeed, been an area where federal rights have been aggressively
imposed upon resistant states. 70 Brown v. Board of Education
represented a rebalancing of the federalism equilibrium in asserting that
neither the law nor mores of states with compulsory school segregation
could stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. 71
Indeed, the history of school desegregation after Brown is something
of a cautionary tale about the perils of education federalism. A year
after Brown in its implementation decision, Brown II, 72 the Court tilted
strongly toward local autonomy. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Warren hailed what he saw as significant progress that some school
districts had already made since Brown. 73 He added that schools might
face particular local issues in moving toward desegregation. Consequently, he added, “[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems . . . .” 74 In turn,
local federal district courts, which often were sympathetic to school
69.

Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 959, 962 (2015).

70.

Other earlier cases also recognized a federal role in education. See, e.g., Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding Oregon’s compulsory public
education statute, which, among other things, prohibited attendance at
private parochial schools, violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding the state’s
prohibition of teaching foreign languages to students before 9th grade
violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).

71.

Other cases dealing with segregation in higher education, such as Sweatt v.
Painter, also represented this kind of rebalancing. 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(finding that the legal education offered to petitioner was not substantially
equal to the University of Texas Law School and that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause required that he be admitted to the
University of Texas Law School).

72.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

73.

Id. at 299.

74.

Id.
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district efforts to slow down or impede desegregation, would retain jurisdiction over the cases. This was to be accomplished with “all deliberate speed.” 75 Yet, ten years after Brown, a mere 2.3% of African
American children attended integrated southern schools. 76 Only when
the full force of the federal government intervened to rebalance federal
and local authority by coupling the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965 77 did progress
begin to happen regarding desegregation of southern schools. Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination by government agencies that received federal money. 78 The threat of losing federal funding
became much more potent in 1965 with the enactment of ESEA which
provided for a major flow of federal funding to schools. 79 The judiciary’s
patience with the delaying tactics of school districts also ran out. That
growing impatience, and willingness to displace local autonomy with
federal command, culminated in Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, Virginia. 80 There the Court rejected the county’s
“freedom of choice” plan, which nominally permitted African American
children to choose to attend any school in the district, but practically
continued segregation. 81 Instead, it ordered the county to speedily adopt
plans that would create a unitary school system. 82 This confluence of
agreement among the three branches of federal government that local
school autonomy must give way to an aggressive assertion of federal
rights regarding education had a powerful impact on southern schools,
but the retreat to state autonomy began not long after the Green decision.
The impulse to defer to state and local authority in education, even
when constitutional or other federally created rights are at stake, continues to play out. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 83 (NCLB)

75.

Id. at 301.

76.

John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and
Society 1961–1974, at 196 (1991).

77.

Id. at 178.

78.

42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (2012).

79.

See generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (authorizing Congress to appropriate federal funds to
states and LEAs for the education of K-12 students).

80.

391 U.S. 430 (1968).

81.

Id. at 441.

82.

Id. at 437–38.

83.

No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified in various sections of Title 20 of the U.S. Code).
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represented a major federal effort to reform education nationwide. 84 The
Act was intended to promote educational excellence and equity by
providing for high standards of performance and creating incentives to
achieve those standards. 85 While NCLB called for setting rigorous
standards in core subjects and testing to monitor those standards with
reporting requirements for schools and consequences for poorly performing schools, it also, in deference to education federalism, let each
state set its own academic standards. The results have been largely
regarded as disappointing. 86 The impact of education federalism can
also be seen in IDEA’s treatment of disproportionality monitoring, perhaps with similarly disappointing consequences.
Since the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, Congress has made a
concerted effort to maintain a balance of federal and state oversight of
special education programs by including specific provisions for the U.S.
Department of Education and the Office of Special Education Programs
to monitor and enforce equitable practices for placing students, particularly racial and ethnic minority students, into special education. 87
Research conducted since the most recent reauthorization, however,
strongly suggests that states vary widely in how they interpret and
enforce the federal provisions. 88 This is mostly due to changes in the
methods used to measure disproportionate representation at the district
level and state variation regarding what constitutes significant disproportionality.
The IDEA amendment and reauthorization ushered in systemic
state monitoring and enforcement practices with a significant focus on
numerical criteria, and this moved policymakers and school- and statelevel district leaders away from using qualitative indicators of disproportionate representation to making primary use of quantitative indicators. While these quantitative indicators shape problem identification
and state response across states, they have also served to signal which
components of the disproportionate representation monitoring and enforcement process under the IDEA are most relevant to any policy sanctions. In 2004, the OSEP/Westat Disproportionality task force issued

84.

See id. (enacting legislative reform with a focus on annual state-level testing
of all K-12 students (including students with disabilities), adequate yearly
progress at the school-level, and teacher accountability standards).

85.

Id.

86.

For a discussion of education federalism and NCLB, see Robinson, supra note
68, at 322–30 (explaining how education federalism undermines reform efforts
such as NCLB).

87.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (prior to 2004 reauthorization).

88.

Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 1.
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guidelines concurrent with the 2004 IDEA reauthorization that “recommended that states use a risk ratio as a means for comparing the
probability for special education placement.” 89 Broadly, a state uses risk
ratios to measure risk for disproportionate representation by examining
the probability that a racial or ethnic minority student with a disability
will receive special education and related services, in relation to the size
of the overall risk for special education placement within the state or
district. A risk ratio “compares the relative size of two risks by dividing
the risk for a specific racial/ethnic group by the risk for a comparison
group.” 90 For example, if a district reports that the risk for African
American/Black children of receiving special education and related
services for autism was 3.25 times the risk for all other children, then
the District is essentially reporting that African American/Black children were 3.25 times as likely to receive services for autism than all other
children.
However, risk ratios can be difficult to interpret when there are
small numbers of students at the district level in either the racial and
ethnic group or the comparison group. 91 In school districts where there
were fewer than ten students in a given racial or ethnic group, the task
force recommended an alternative weighted risk ratio out of concern
that the risk ratio methodology might misidentify certain districts as
having a disproportionality problem where none existed. 92 Thereafter,
many states shifted to measuring the risk of disproportionate representation via weighted risk ratios or alternative risk ratios. 93 The weighted
risk ratio combines district-level risk data with state-level demographics
to yield standardized risk ratios for across-district comparisons, 94 thus
helping states to determine a specific racial or ethnic group’s risk of
receiving special education and related services for a disability compared to the risk for all other children when the risk is standardized
89.

Wendy Cavendish, Alfredo J. Artiles & Beth Harry, Tracking Inequality 60
Years After Brown: Does Policy Legitimize the Racialization of Disability?,
14 Multiple Voices for Ethnically Diverse Exceptional Learners,
no. 2, 2014, at 30, 33. Westat is a statistical survey research corporation that
provides research services to various agencies within the U.S. Government.
See Our Clients, Westat, https://www.westat.com/about-us/our-clients
[https://perma.cc/47K8-ZUPE] (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).

90.

Bollmer et al., supra note 7, at 22.

91.

See id. (“A risk ratio of 1.00 indicates no difference between the risks. A risk
ratio greater than 1.00 indicates the risk for the comparison group, while a
risk ratio less than 1.00 indicates the risk for the racial/ethnic group is less
than the risk for the comparison group. Risk ratios can never be less than
0.00.”).

92.

Id. at 23, 73.

93.

Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 21.

94.

Id. at 32.
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based on state-level racial or ethnic demographic information. By using
a weighted risk ratio based on standardized state data, however, states
can have similar weighted ratios for both large and small districts.95 For
small districts, this means that small enrollment changes can impact
the direction of overrepresentation or underrepresentation. This can
lead to small districts being misidentified as having under-representation or overrepresentation, depending upon the state-level data.
Finally, another popular measurement tool for states is the use of
the alternative risk ratio where the district risk is compared against the
statewide comparison group, thus aiding states in gaining a better understanding of whether a child from a racial or ethnic group is more or
less likely to receive special education and related services for a disability in a district versus the risk for all other children within the
state. 96 Unlike the weighted risk ratio or the risk ratio, the alternative
risk ratio is also a more reliable measure when districts have only a few
children in one or more racial or ethnic groups, which enables states to
evaluate both district disproportionality and to compare children from
a racial or ethnic group in a district to children from other racial or
ethnic groups within the state. 97
In an analysis of data from state Annual Performance Reports to
examine progress made in identifying disproportionality, Albrecht and
colleagues (2012) found that a number of states subsequently shifted
from using a standard risk ratio approach to using a weighted or alternative risk ratio with criteria for disproportionate representation that
often included “progressively larger cut-offs” 98 for what constitutes disproportionate representation. By providing states a set of alternatives
to using traditional risk ratios to compare the probability of special
education placement, federal policy and recommended practices have
also allowed states and LEAs to mask patterns of disproportionate
placement and limit the “structural and historical underpinnings of the
problem.” 99 Moreover, this has led to a troubling trend across states
where states are both able to meet the IDEA mandate and also not
report indices of disproportionate representation by increasing the student size minimum required for the risk ratio cutoff scores that must
be reported to the state. With these practices, states enable themselves
to only address disproportionality when it impacts a significant number

95.

Bollmer et al., supra note 7, at 32, 47.

96.

Id. at 23, 31.

97.

Id.

98.

Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 21.

99.

Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 33.
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of students with higher levels of risk for special education and related
services. 100
A second difficulty associated with disproportionality monitoring
and policy enforcement is related to the lack of policy specificity regarding what constitutes significant disproportionality101 in special education placements and settings. Until full implementation of the 2016
disproportionality regulations occurs, each state is responsible for
drafting and adopting its own definition as to what constitutes significant disproportionality of minority students in special education, and
this determination is not based on recommended determinations or best
evidence within the field. 102 The 2003 Government Accountability
Office report examined a sample of sixteen states and reviewed each
states’ definition of significant disproportionality based on the 2010–11
School Year and found wide variation in definitions of the term
significant disproportionality among the sample. 103 In addition, the
report noted that “some states’ definitions may be preventing them
from identifying disproportionality.” 104
Under IDEA, each state must also monitor and collect data regarding disproportionate representation that is the result of inappropriate
identification. However, “inappropriate identification” 105 is not defined
within IDEA, and each state or LEA has discretion to determine which
aspects of the identification process are practices that can be held as
“inappropriate.” 106 Some research has found that, since the 2004 reauthorization, the number of districts that have reported disproportionate
representation due to “inappropriate identification” has drastically decreased. 107 Most states currently report that there are no districts within
each state that have been flagged as a district with disproportionality
due to “inappropriate identification” by the district. One possible reason for the decline in “inappropriate identification” flags may be due to
additional scrutiny that comes with the flag. That is, the “inappropriate
identification” flag serves as an automatic trigger which requires a state
to achieve compliance within one year and to set aside funds for CEIs,
100. Id.
101. Id. at 32–33.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d) (2012).
103. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Pub. No. 13-137, Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Standards Needed to Improve Identification of Racial and Ethnic Overrepresentation in Special
Education 22 (2013).
104. Id. at 18.
105. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 33.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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and this may discourage states from using the “inappropriate identification” flag as a check against any LEAs within the state that might
be engaging in “inappropriate identification.” 108
While IDEA includes monitoring and enforcement provisions, there
are ways for states to skirt federal policy and under-report or fail to
report disproportionate representation. This is a troubling consequence
of gaps within IDEA. Current policy fails to adequately address disproportionality as a civil rights issue with accompanying remedies for traditionally under-represented racial and ethnic minority groups who are
at-risk for discrimination within special education placements. This is
true despite repeated calls for federal policy and guidelines for administrative practices to “align, resulting in consistent and effective actions
by the states to eliminate the long-standing and still prevalent problem
of racial and ethnic disproportionality.” 109 Moreover, it also signals to
parents of students with disabilities that IDEA’s monitoring and enforcement provisions for disproportionate representation lack substantive sanctions at the state- and district-level when LEAs fail to comply.

III. “Significant Disproportionality” and Intentional
Discrimination Claims
As state policy monitoring has been found to either inadequately
define or find evidence of significant disproportionality across states,
potential claimants have relied on litigation to show intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs, however, face an uphill battle in using schooland district-level placement data to prove intentional discrimination,
even when policy monitoring under IDEA has led to a finding that
significant disproportionality by race or ethnicity in special education
and related services has occurred within the plaintiff’s district.
In Blunt v. Lower Merion School District, a group of plaintiffs alleged that the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) improperly placed
African American children in special education. 110 Originally, plaintiffs
brought the action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as a class action lawsuit, but the court declined to
certify the class action. 111 This limited the case and its eventual ruling
108. Albrecht et al., supra note 55, at 22.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011),
aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014).
111. The complicated procedural history of the case is beyond the scope of the
article. Suffice it to say that a group of plaintiffs, including Amber Blunt and
her parents, Crystal and Michael Blunt, filed a complaint in July 2007
against the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) and certain school officials
alleging violations of IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, along with violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights
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to the named plaintiffs only. The plaintiffs alleged that LMSD racially
discriminated against a class of African American students, “in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 112 The plaintiffs in the
case were current or former African American students who were identified as having a disability by LMSD. 113 Each student had received some
special education services while also being enrolled in some general education classes. The plaintiffs asserted that they were not “disabled”114
or “students with disabilities” 115 as defined under IDEA, and were thus
only labeled as “students with a disability” 116 due to racial discrimination. 117 The plaintiffs further alleged that placement into special education classes occurred on the basis of incorrect disability diagnoses,
incomplete evaluations for special education eligibility, and subjective
determinations of disability. 118 In addition, the plaintiffs argued that
there were not only a disproportionate number of African American
children who received special education services from LMSD, but that
plaintiffs were denied access and enrollment to advanced and college
preparatory classes such as higher-level science courses, advanced history, and foreign language classes. 119 The plaintiffs also alleged that
Act of 1964, and Section 1982. Additionally, they alleged a violation of
Pennsylvania’s public education law as a pendent state law claim. Id. at 751.
After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add additional plaintiffs and
defendants, the defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule
12(b)(6). The district court granted much of the motion and dismissed most
of the claims. Id. at 751–52.
After a second and then third amended complaint, what remained of the
plaintiffs’ case were claims of violations of Title VI and Section 1983 arising
out of racial discrimination by LMSD. Id. at 752.
112. Id. at 751–52.
113. Id. at 752. Throughout the discovery stage of the case before the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, there were disputed facts
regarding the disability status of several named plaintiffs. Named plaintiff
students contended that they did not have disabilities, but these students
stated in their Third Amended Complaint that they were students with IDEAeligible disabilities. The court assumed for purposes of the case that, with
the exception of plaintiffs Chantae Hall and Lydia Johnson, the plaintiffs
were not students with disabilities. Id. at 753.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 760.
116. Id. at 753.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 760.
119. Id. at 753. “In 2005, the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE)
found that there was a disproportionate number of African American students
in special education programs in [LMSD].” Id. at 757. By 2006, however, the
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complaints to teachers and administrators made prior to the start of
litigation regarding inadequate determinations of special education eligibility and inadequate course selection options went unanswered. 120
A.

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District—U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania

After the plaintiffs submitted their final series of amended complaints, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered the remaining claims in 2011. 121 Plaintiffs’ first
claim was that LMSD racially discriminated against African American
students by assigning them disproportionately to special education
placements in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.122
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to “ensure that the [LMSD] properly
educate[s] all African American students with disabilities.” 123 The court
concluded that even though the plaintiffs had provided systematic statistical evidence of racial disproportionality within the special education
program and associated special education placements within LMSD in
2007, 2008, and 2009, this was not sufficient to create a prima facie case
under Title VI. 124

PDE closed its investigation of LMSD. In its report, the PDE claimed that
the district now had a percentage of children with disabilities that was comparable to data across the state. In addition, the PDE found that LMSD met
special education disproportionate representation targets by race/ethnicity
in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Id.
120. Opening Brief of Appellants at 11–13, Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist.,
826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (No.
11-4200).
121. Id. at 752.
122. Id. at 758. Title VI provides that: “No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
123. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
124. Id. at 759, 763. The Plaintiffs’ claims were made based on identification
practices during the 2006–2007 SY and 2007–2008 SY. In the 2006–2007 SY,
there were 6,981 students in the district. Of that, approximately 7.9% were
African American and approximately 83.2% were Caucasian. There were
1,187 students (17%) within the total student body who received special
education services and approximately 14.5% of those students were African
American students enrolled in LMSD and had IEPs. Id. at 757.
In the 2007–2008 SY, LMSD had 6,914 students, with 8.1% of the student
population identified as African American and 83.1% percent identified as
Caucasian. 1,158 students (16.7%) received some type of special education
or related services. 14% of the students receiving those services were African
American and 80.8% were Caucasian. Id.
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The district court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions
holding that Title VI entitled plaintiffs to claims of intentional discrimination only. 125 To make out a prima facie case under Title VI, the
court held that:
[P]laintiffs must show that: (1) they are members of a protected
class; (2) they were qualified to continue in pursuit of their education; (3) they suffered an adverse action; and (4) such action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 126

The court ruled that, although a lack of “comparative evidence” 127 regarding the treatment of similarly-situated students outside the protected class was not “fatal to a plaintiff’s prima facie case,” 128 Title VI
only reaches to instances of intentional discrimination. 129 Turning to
proof of intentional discrimination, the court noted that while statistical
evidence of disparate impact may be an initial step towards determining
the existence of intentional discrimination, it is not without other evidence sufficient. 130 Further, the ruling noted that plaintiffs’ evidence to
support allegations that LMSD committed “various improprieties” were
insufficient to prove a prima facie case. These allegations included:
(1) destroying testing protocols; (2) failing to obtain parental permission before conducting evaluations; (3) neglecting to notify
parents regarding procedural safeguards available to them under
the IDEA; (4) failing to provide drafts of individual education
plans (“IEPs”) to parents; (5) omitting information from evaluation reports and IEPs; (6) failing to conduct proper and timely
reevaluations; (7) obtaining parental consent without providing
all relevant documents; and (8) evaluating students to determine
their eligibility for services under the IDEA without conducting
evaluations. 131

In the subsequent 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 SY, the number of students
within the district did not significantly increase or decrease (6,788 and 7,072
students, respectively), and the percentage of African American students who
received special education services also did not significantly increase or decrease
(13.7%, 14.3%, respectively). Id.
125. Id. at 758–59.
126. Id. at 758.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 759 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 760.
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In other words, the plaintiffs offered evidence that LMSD systematically violated or ignored their procedural rights under IDEA, and
the court held that these allegations might prove to serve as the foundation for a claim under IDEA but were insufficient to prove a prima
facie case or withstand a motion for summary judgment. 132 Therefore,
the court reasoned that plaintiffs’ evidence of “disproportionality alone”
was not sufficient evidence necessary to meet the components of a Title
VI prima facie case, particularly the requirement that plaintiffs must
prove intentional discrimination on the part of LMSD, even when coupled with evidence of widespread procedural violations. 133 Thus, the motion of LMSD for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Title VI claims
was granted. 134
The plaintiffs also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 135 The court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim,
on the ground that section 1983 similarly requires proof of purposeful
discrimination. 136 The court held that the evidence that actions of the
LMSD had disproportionate impact on African Americans was not sufficient, finding that “[p]laintiffs have not put forth more than a scintilla” 137 of evidence that LMSD acted with a racially discriminatory
purpose when it identified plaintiff students as disabled and offered
special education and related services. 138 This, the court held, was the
correct ruling even if identification for special education and related
services was somehow incorrect. 139 In sum, no evidence of discrimination

132. Id. at 760, 763.
133. Id. at 763.
134. Id.
135. Id. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
To bring a successful § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “‘(1) a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution;’ and (2) that the violation
‘was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.’” Blunt, 826
F. Supp. 2d at 763 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)).
136. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 764–65.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
139. Id. (citing Williams, 891 F.2d at 460–61 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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short of direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as biased statements by district officials, would satisfy the court, even at the summary
judgment stage of the litigation.
B.

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District—U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit

On December 1, 2011, the Blunt plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal from
portions of the District Court’s Memorandum and Judgment Order that
granted a final summary judgment to the defendant (LMSD). 140 On
appeal, the court considered a number of questions including whether
the district court abused its discretion in its consideration of the weight
it gave to the plaintiffs’ evidence for the purpose of ruling on the motion
for summary judgment. 141 Relatedly, it considered whether the district
court erred in ruling that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination in violation of Title VI and section 1983 in granting of the district’s motion for summary judgment. 142 In a lengthy ruling, the divided three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and most notably held that there was no genuine
issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate nor
evidence showing that LMSD or its employees intentionally discriminated against African American students. 143
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the entry of summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ Title VI and
section 1983 claims and held that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima
facie case of discrimination for either claim. 144 The court further held
that the evidence found to be inadmissible by the district court did not
have to be considered in a light most favorable to the non-movant
plaintiffs because it could not be introduced at trial. 145 The court also
asserted that, regardless of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs’ evidence would not have been admissible during the district court
hearing. 146
In addition, the court reiterated the district court’s assertion that
statistical evidence alone is not sufficient to prove a claim of intentional
140. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015). On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the appellants again brought forth claims to seek relief pursuant to
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment through
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 267.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 301.
144. Id. at 302.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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discrimination because the statistical evidence did not sufficiently show
that LMSD’s policy and practices were the actual cause of discrimination. 147 The court held that, on taking the appellants’ evidence as a
whole, there was no evidence showing intentional discrimination on the
part of LMSD, nor was there evidence that district employees intentionally discriminated against African American plaintiffs. 148 Moreover,
the court held that even though the appellants provided five years of
statistical evidence supporting their claim that racial or ethnic minority
students were disproportionately represented within LMSD, there were
also evaluation procedures in place used for all students, regardless of
race, who received special education and related services. 149 Thus, due
to the uniform evaluation procedures in place and regardless of statistical evidence showing significant disproportionality, the court held
that “there simply is no discrimination.” 150
Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee concurred in part but disagreed
with the affirmation of the lower court summary judgment in favor of
the district. 151 McKee took issue with the way the majority applied the
“deliberate indifference” 152 standard under Title VI, finding it inconsistent with precedent, difficult to prove, and more than what the summary judgment standard requires. 153 He concluded that the parent and
student plaintiffs had offered evidence that served as a sufficient basis
for the case to move beyond the summary judgment stage by citing the
report of Dr. James Conroy, Ph.D., an expert on disability policy, special education, and statistical analysis. 154 Conroy found, within LMSD,
statistically significant evidence showing that both overrepresentation
of African American students in special education classes and underrepresentation of African American students in advanced placement
classes had occurred. 155 Judge McKee criticized the majority justices for
failing to consider the expert report as part of the basis for summary
judgment evidence because it highlighted “procedural irregularities in
the erroneous and improper placement of African American students

147. Id. at 302–03.
148. Id. at 300–01.
149. Id. at 300.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 305 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 314 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 314–20 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. Id. at 323–27 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 323–24 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[within the LMSD] in special education classes [that were] the result of
bias (i.e. deliberate indifference), ineptitude, or coincidence.” 156
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for
certiorari, thus leaving in place the case’s dismissal and concluding a
long, procedural fight to secure an additional pathway for the enforcement of rights secured under the IDEA. 157 The Third Circuit decision
erects a significant barrier for future intentional discrimination claims,
even if those claims are linked to both widespread violations of IDEA’s
procedural protections coupled with statistical evidence of disproportionate representation within the LEA or district. 158 In a public statement after the denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, which had been part of the
legal team representing the plaintiffs throughout the litigation, released
a statement and noted that Blunt effectively closed the door to future
similar litigation: “The case is over. What this means is that the fight
to reduce disproportionate and inappropriate referral to special education will be fought on different territory. This is a national issue, and
we are considering what strategies are most effective for the next
step.” 159

Conclusion: The Future of Disproportionality
Monitoring and Recommendations
The new IDEA regulations went into effect on January 18, 2017.160
States, LEAs, policymakers, parents and advocates must now work to
address the revised policy provisions that require states and LEAs to,
among other things, use a standard methodology to determine whether
significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity is occurring
within the state and LEAs. 161 Moreover, states must continue to address
significant disproportionality by incidence, duration, and type of disciplinary action (including suspensions and expulsions) as well as revise
156. Id. at 322 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Allston v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015).
158. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 335 (McKee, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (concluding that the court erroneously ruled that there was no genuine
dispute of material fact to be determined in the case).
159. Blunt v. LMSD, The Public Interest Law Ctr., www.pilcop.org/bluntvs-lmsd/ [https://perma.cc/QQD7-4ZEP] (last visited Mar. 22 2017).
160. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities; Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,376 (Dec. 19,
2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). States and LEAs are not required
to comply with these regulations until July 1, 2018. Moreover, states and
LEAs are not required to include children ages three through five in the
review of significant disproportionality by disability classification. Id.
161. Id.
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policies and find comprehensive coordinated early intervening services
when significant disproportionality is found. 162 Several of the new regulatory provisions have been requested by special education advocates
since the 2004 reauthorization as a way to provide greater equity and
accountability, particularly as a way to limit systemic patterns of overrepresentation such as that found within the Lower Merion School District. 163 Yet, there are lingering concerns about the potential reach of
the new provisions, particularly relating to students with disabilities
who are at high risk of being disproportionately placed and identified.164
While states and LEAs will now have greater responsibility and a
more uniform methodological approach to disproportionate representation identification, the framework remains largely unchanged from
the old approach based upon principles of education federalism. 165 Overall, the new provisions continue to require states to use a standard
methodology to determine whether there is significant disproportionality based on race or ethnicity. 166 Each state must set “reasonable risk
ratio threshold[s],” and “reasonable” minimum number of students
within a reported subgroup. 167 However, states are still given great flexibility as to how to determine when significant disproportionality exists. 168 In fact, states can choose not to identify an LEA that has
previously exceeded risk ratio thresholds as an LEA with significant
disproportionality as long as the LEA is making “reasonable” progress
in lowering its risk ratio. 169 As with the previous regulations, the state
sets its own determination for what constitutes “reasonable” progress.170
Thus, the concern remains that the new approach to examining, identifying, and rectifying disproportionate representation of racial or ethnic
minority students with disabilities will not adequately address the underlying civil rights issues that remain. 171 Moreover, coupled with case
precedent firmly establishing that plaintiff parents and students need
more than a showing of an IDEA finding of significant disproportionality or patterns of inappropriate district-wide identification and

162. Id.
163. See The Council for Children with Behavioral Disorders, CCBD’s Position
Summary on Federal Policy on Disproportionality in Special Education, 38
Behav. Disorders 108, 115–17 (2013).
164. Id. at 114–15.
165. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(D) (2016).
166. Id.
167. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(i)(A)–(D) (2016).
168. 34 CFR § 300.647(d)(1)–(2) (2016).
169. 34 CFR § 300.647(d)(2) (2016).
170. 34 CFR § 300.647(b)(1)(D) (2016).
171. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 38.
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assessment procedures for special education placements to prove intentional discrimination, how do potential plaintiff parents and students
best ensure that states and LEAs are engaged in equitable practices
and enforcement with the special education identification and assessment processes? This Conclusion outlines several considerations for
future practice.
Moving forward, it cannot be ignored that enforcement and monitoring are the obligations of states and LEAs across the U.S., and that
ensuring fidelity within this process is the primary, and in many ways
the only, avenue for parents of racial and ethnic minority students with
disabilities to seek equity within the special education identification and
referral processes. Therefore, states must redouble efforts to not only
comply with the updated IDEA regulations, but to also meaningfully
address the underlying factors that have plagued special education for
decades—namely implicit racial bias within the identification, referral,
and assessment processes. In a synthesis study of disproportionate
representation, Morgan and colleagues evaluated whether African
American/Black children are disproportionately overrepresented in
special education. 172 Within the study synthesis, Morgan et al. found
that evidence of overrepresentation significantly declines as additional
“best-evidence” and individual-level student controls were added to
study analyses. 173 That is, certain studies reviewed within the Morgan
et al. review controlled or accounted for the effect of confounding variables that limit the ability to clearly determine the existence of disproportionate representation in studies conducted across the U.S. The synthesis found that, in studies with additional controls, African American
students were “significantly less likely than otherwise similar White
children to receive special education services.” 174 This finding has its
own important implications for the civil rights of racial and ethnic minority school-aged children. Along with the problem of overrepresentation, it suggests that there are patterns of under-representation
whereby minority children are denied necessary educational services
that they are entitled to under IDEA.
Moreover, the study called for states to “intensify the use of culturally sensitive disability screening and evaluation practices.” 175 Those
practices, such as including differential screening tools and shifting disability eligibility procedures, which influence the direction of disproportionate representation, whether towards over- or under-identification, not only limit the reach of IDEA policy designed to promote equity

172. Morgan et al., supra note 6.
173. Id. at 181–98.
174. Id. at 181.
175. Id. at 193.
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for students with disabilities, but may contribute to education inequalities disfavoring the very students whose civil rights IDEA was designed to protect. 176
Second, states and LEAs must adhere to the new regulations requirement to establish a standard methodology to use in their annual
determination of whether significant disproportionality based on race
and ethnicity is occurring within the state. Although flexibility enables
states to ensure that disproportionate representation is accurately identified at the LEA level, it also allows states to potentially mask the
activity of a district engaging in significant disproportionality regarding
placement of a particular group of racial and ethnic minority students
with disabilities. Further, by providing states with flexible exclusionary
criteria as to when LEAs must lower risk ratios, the equity mandate
under IDEA remains unmet and the discourse moves from an equity
focus to “debates over appropriate formulas for calculating overrepresentation.” 177
In addition, it is incumbent upon states to view disproportionality
enforcement and monitoring within the broader civil rights and education context. That is, the rights secured under IDEA were to attain
equity in education for all students with disabilities, and the continuing
reconfiguration of IDEA compliance monitoring provisions signals that
efforts to reduce disparities between students with and without disabilities have not been entirely successful. Though several of the earliest
successful legal challenges to school segregation involved students with
disabilities, unresolved issues and continuing inequities for racial and
ethnic minority students with disabilities persist. Therefore, states and
the Office of Special Education Programs must take meaningful action
to develop intervention programs that identify trends and practices in
special education identification and referrals, so that policymakers have
a greater understanding of which racial and ethnic minority groups are
at-risk for over- or under-identification within special education placements. Moreover, states must continue to support administrators and
teachers by providing them with evidence-based and culturally responsive approaches to identification, referral, and assessment procedures
within special education.
Finally, civil rights legislation in special education is inextricably
linked to the civil rights struggle to secure education rights for racial
and ethnic minority students across the U.S. While racial and ethnic
minority students with disabilities face challenges that are different
than those without disabilities, policymakers and administrators at the
state and district-level must still be held responsible to all students and
eliminate racial or ethnic segregation in special education, general education, or advanced placement classes. Since future potential plaintiffs
176. Id. at 194.
177. Cavendish et al., supra note 89, at 37.
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seem unlikely to have success by pursuing intentional discrimination
claims, it is necessary to hold states accountable for non-discrimination
in special education and related services using the limited means that
are available for civil rights advocates. What remains uncertain, at this
point, is whether the new regulations will be used to effectively monitor
and address disproportionate representation at the state and district
levels or whether it will result in continued intransigence over stateand district-level accountability towards racial and ethnic minority
families and students with disabilities.
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